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Warfare was an always tragic, often definitive, and sometimes predictable 
form of interaction between imperial China and pastoral nomadic peoples. 
Chinese states and pastoral nomadic polities were each passionately 
committed to their own ecologies and ways of life and regarded the other as 
less than fully human, and the hatreds born of this mutual dehumanisation 
contributed to hostility and conflict between them. Each side had its own 
preferred ways of warfare but found it necessary to learn the other’s as well. 
As early as 307 BCE, King Wuling of Zhao had fielded Chinese mounted 
archers against the pastoral nomadic enemies of his state. Since Han Times 
(202 BCE – CE 220) various groups of pastoral nomads often beat northern 
Chinese jurisdictions into submission through relentless raids and incursions, 
but when they wanted to conquer recalcitrant walled cities or fortresses they 
had to use sedentary forces and tactical methods. 
Like many pastoral nomadic peoples before them, the Mongols 
waged fierce and intermittent warfare against imperial China. The Mongol 
wars against China were, however, different from all the others preceeding 
them. The Mongol conquest of China in 1279 was not an entirely bad thing 
for China because it accomplished what the previous Song dynasty (960-
1279) could not: the unification of historically Chinese territory under a 
single government. The swift and mobile military tactics of the Mongols in 
their campaigns against China throughout much of the thirteenth century, 
both on land and on rivers and the sea, reunified China and largely defined 
the majority of the territorial extent of Chinese territory today. The Mongol 
conquest was thus an integral and essential episode in Chinese history. 
 
 
Mongol strategic and tactical preferences 
 
In China the Mongols did at times engage in protracted sieges of walled 
cities and fortresses, including the failed campaign against the Diaoyu 
Fortress in Sichuan in 1259 and the ultimately victorious ones against the 
twin cities of Xiangyang and Fancheng (in central China) in 1273, the 





successful prosecution of which involved the use of counter-weighted 
trebuchets constructed and deployed by Middle Eastern siege technicians. 
Over the course of the thirteenth century the Mongols laid siege to fortified 
cities when they had no other choice, but overall they retained their 
instinctive aversion against protracted sieges and their strong preference for 
rapid and mobile offensives. From 1274 through 1279, during the final push 
of the Mongol conquest of the Song Dynasty in Song China, highly swift 
and mobile Mongol Yuan ships were as important on rivers and seas as the 
Mongol cavalry had been earlier during the conquest of northern China.  
Especially under Khubilai Khan, the Mongols avoided siege warfare 
whenever possible. In the mid-1270s Khubilai instructed his general Bayan 
to wage swift mobile warfare and avoid sieges on Song cities at almost, but 
not quite all, costs. Bayan took these instructions from his sovereign to 
heart, and during his campaigns on the Yangzi River and southward to 
Lin’an with a massive international force that included a navy, Mongol 
cavalry, Chinese infantry, and Middle Eastern mechanical artillery corps, he 
laid siege to and massacred only two cities: Shayang (in central China), ‘in 
order to establish a credible threat to any city they approached with orders 
to surrender,’ and Changzhou, ‘in order to show that no city that had 
previously submitted to the Yuan could revert to allegiance to the Song 
without suffering the direst of consequences.’1 Bayan readily grasped and 
largely followed through on what Khubilai wanted: many more swift and 
mobile attacks and many fewer protracted siege quagmires. Here the 
Mongols’ preferences paralleled Sunzi’s strong cautions against sieges: 
 
The grand strategy formulated by Khubilai and applied by Bayan did 
not represent a Sino-Mongolian strategic fusion, medley, or 
reconciliation, because Sunzi’s aversion to protracted, positional 
warfare and attacks on fortified cities on the one hand and the 
Mongolian aversion to the same on the other were not 
fundamentally dissimilar. Likewise, and for the same reasons, 
Khubilai’s grand strategy was not a Sino-Mongolian strategic 
symbiosis or synthesis. Khubilai’s grand strategy was, rather, a 
fortuitous and convenient combination of conceptually similar 
                                                     
1 D.C. Wright, ‘Debates in the Field During Bayan’s Campaigns Against Song 
China, 1274-1276’ in: P.A. Lorge ed., Debating War in Chinese History (Leiden 2013) 
141-162. 








Speed and mobility 
 
In his excessively harsh review of Timothy May’s useful and insightful The 
Mongol Art of War, Denis Sinor pans May’s brief comparative discussion of 
the similarities between the swift and mobile warfare of the Mongols on the 
one hand and the Blitzkrieg of the German Wehrmacht during the Second 
World War on the other.3 According to Sinor: ‘contrary to his [May’s] view, 
I think that the idea of the Blitzkrieg of World War II is basically different 
from the Mongol concept of warfare. What characterized the long-range 
Mongol campaigns was slow advance that could take years preceding the 
final onslaught.’4 But May does not push the comparison between the two 
styles of warfare to an inappropriate or unreasonable extent, and he does 
not argue or imply that the Mongols were not slow, careful, and methodical 
planners in their campaigns of conquest. Sinor confuses long-term strategy 
with short-term tactical execution, and May is essentially right at the tactical 
level. Strategically, Khubilai Khan was a careful and patient man who had a 
long-planning horizon, and it took him thirty years of trying before he 
finally conquered all of China in 1279. But the final concerted campaigns 
against Song China, when they did come in the mid to late 1270s, were 
indeed executed very swiftly. Mongol Yuan battles waged against Song 
China during this time were swift and decisive engagements in which 
mobility was an indispensable factor and signal contribution to victory.  
                                                     
2 Wright, ‘Debates in the Field’, 160.  
3 T. May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System (Yardley, 
PA 2007) 144-146. 
4  D. Sinor, ‘The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military 
System (review)’, Journal of Military History 71.4 (2007) 1223-1224. In this review 
Sinor also criticises May’s book because its ‘(…)descriptions jump from one 
military theater to the other and follow no clear chronology.’ But this is simply 
because May’s approach is topical and, as such, not amenable to chronological 
treatment or consideration. Topic and chronology are two major divides that every 
historian must traverse, but not simultaneously. Over two thousand years ago, the 
great Chinese historian Sima Qian discovered that chronological and topical 
coverage had to be done in separate sections. 





May is correct about Blitzkrieg-style speed and mobility being the chief 
military asset of the Mongols, as was B. H. Liddell Hart decades before him: 
 
Another canon that they [the Mongols] tore up was that mobile 
troops, such as cavalry, must need rest on a stable infantry base (…) 
The prime feature of the Mongol military system was therefore its 
simplicity, due to the use of a single arm [cavalry], in contrast to the 
inevitably complex organisation of a combination of several arms 
which has always characterised European armies(…) The single arm 
they used was that which possessed the highest degree of mobility, 
and in this lay the secret of their unbroken run of victory.5 
 
In this passage Hart was actually writing more about Chinggis (Jenghis) 
Khan and Sübötei (Sabutai) Baghatur than the Mongols in general, even 
though at times he seems to have equated the two. Hart’s observations, 
while correct enough regarding the importance of speed and mobility in the 
Mongols’ conquests, were not broad enough and therefore do contain some 
error. That is, Hart was partially wrong not about speed and mobility, but 
about the terrain and the means of transportation. During the final 
conquest of Song China in the 1270s, swift mobility was not limited to 
Mongol cavalry. After the Mongol Yuan forces finally took Xiangyang and 
Fancheng in 1273, their commanders (who were both Mongols and Han 
Chinese) instinctively took very well to warships as vehicles for swift tactical 
mobility. What Mongol horses had for decades been on land, Yuan ships 
were now on water, both on the Yangzi River and, from 1277 through 1279, 
along China’s southeastern and southern coasts. And on the water, as on 
the land, Yuan forces racked up victory after victory not because of force 
majeure or overwhelmingly superior numbers, but because of superior 
speed and mobility.  
 
 
Bayan’s campaigns down the Yangzi, 1274-1276  
 
Bayan began his campaigns against Song in October 1274, when he 
assembled his forces at Xiangyang and Fancheng, thence proceeding 
                                                     
5 B.H. Lidell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled: From Genghis Khan to General Wolfe (Novato, 
CA 1990) 32-33. 




southward along the Han River. Because of Bayan’s desire to proceed 
swiftly, he did not make extensive use of his superb artillery forces to batter 
down city walls. He used his artillery on only three occasions, one from 
ashore against Song warships on the Yangzi River, and two against Song 
Chinese cities. After the initial massacre of Shayang, Chinese cities 
surrendered peacefully once his forces approached them and ordered them 
to surrender. On 11 January 1275 Bayan’s forces crossed the Yangzi and 
landed massive forces on its southern bank, an important advance that 
shattered Song morale even as it heightened Yuan morale. Massive naval 
battles at several points down the Yangzi ensued, with the Yuan winning 
them all. In November 1275 his forces began approaching Lin’an (the Song 
capital city, modern Hangzhou on China’s east coast) with both overland 
and coastal naval forces. Along his way he completely massacred the city of 
Changzhou as punishment for its reversion to Song allegiance after it had 
earlier surrendered to the Yuan.6 By late January 1276 Bayan’s forces were 
pressing closely in on Lin’an.  
 
 
The Song surrender  
 
There was panic and desperation at the Song court in Lin’an in January and 
February 1276. Song high officials Wen Tianxiang and Zhang Shijie wanted 
Grand Empress Dowager Xie, Empress Dowager Quan, and the young 
imperial heir apparent Zhao Xian to flee the capital and escape on the sea, 
but Grand Councilor Chen Yizhong did not approve of this; instead he 
chose to surrender. Knowing that the jig was now up at last, the Song 
government sent envoys to Gaoting Mountain, where Bayan had encamped, 
and there they submitted Song’s official imperial jade governmental seal 
(yuxi) and an instrument of surrender (xiangbiao) to him in unambiguous 
gestures of utter capitulation.7  Literarily surrender was not a particularly 
impressive performance; perhaps the Song literatus or literati who wrote it 
up did not think it appropriate to make such a humiliating document very 
elegant: 
 
                                                     
6 On the Changzhou massacre see: D.C. Wright, ‘The Mongol General Bayan and 
the Massacre of Changzhou 1275’, Altaica 7 (2002) 108-121. 
7 Yuanshi [History of Yuan] (Beijing 1976) 9.177. 





I, [Zhao] Xian, the sovereign of the state of Song, respectfully and 
with a hundred obeisances say: I, [Zhao] Xian, am of minor account 
and am young and dilute. My family has met with many difficulties. 
The villain [formerly] in power, Jia Sidao, turned his back on our 
[peace] covenant and harmed the state, leading to [Yuan’s] labour at 
mobilising troops and inquiring into wrongdoings. It is not that I, 
Xian, do not wish to run and hide in seeking barely to survive; but 
the Mandate of Heaven has, after all, found its place [against Song], 
and whence shall I, Xian, flee? I have reverentially received of the 
Grand Empress Dowager a command to pare away my title as 
emperor and to offer up to the sagacious [Yuan] court all of the 
currently available jurisdictions of Liang-Zhe East Circuit and Liang-
Zhe West Circuit [Zhedong and Zhexi], Fujian, Jiangnan East Circuit 
and Jiangnan West Circuit, Hu’nan [Jinghu South Circuit], Guangnan 
East Circuit and Guangnan West Circuit, Sichuan, and the Eastern 
and Western Huainan Circuits. For the [sake of the] living souls of 
the state I implore in sorrow and request [Your Majesty’s] commands. 
Prostrate, I hope for [Your Majesty’s] sagacious compassion and 
bequeathal of solicitude, for [Your Majesty] not to be able to bear for 
the ancestral shrines of your servant Xian to come suddenly to death 
and severance, and for [Your Majesty] to deign to hand down [an 
order for the] preservation intact [of the Zhao family ancestral 
shrines]. [If so], then generation after generation the descendants of 
the Zhao clan will have [something on which] to rely and will not 
dare stop or forget [it].8 
 
After receiving Song’s capitulation, Bayan summoned Song’s now fugitive 
Grand Councilor Chen Yizhong (who did not keep a date to meet and 
negotiate with Bayan at Chang’an) to come forth and discuss further the 
particulars of the surrender, and he sent a high Yuan officer to take the 
imperial seal to Khubilai Khan’s court at Shangdu.9  
On 5 February 1276, Bayan proceeded to a point that day only fifty li 
north of Lin’an when a Yuan messenger came with disquieting news: ‘Chen 
Yizhong and the Lianghuai [defenders] Zhang Shijie, Su Liuyi, Liu Shiyong, 
and others have taken the [imperial Zhao clan] Princes Guang and Yi and 
fled from Qiantang. Only the Grand Empress Dowager [Xie] and the young 
                                                     
8  I translated the version in Bi Yuan, Xu Zizhi Tongjian [Continuation of the 
Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government] (Beijing 1987) 182.4976. 
9 Bi Yuan, Xu Zizhi Tongjian 182.4976. 




sovereign remain unmoved in their palace.’10 Fortunately for the population 
and city of Lin’an, Bayan chose not to regard this as an act of general 
defiance and resistance, but rather one of obstinacy by a few key individuals 
and the followers they could attract. But as it turned out, these two young 
princes Guang and Yi were later to be installed as minor emperors by a 
stubborn and diehard Song loyalist movement. Song pretenders resisted 
Yuan rule until the spring of 1279, and until that time Yuan did not consider 
its victory over Song final.   
On February 6 Bayan ordered Yuan officials to proceed to Lin’an, 
enter the Song palace, and give instructions to the Grand Empress Dowager. 
In response two days later, the Song Grand Empress Dowager Xie sent 
several high Song officials, including Wen Tianxiang, to see Bayan at the 
Mingyin Shrine, and Bayan comforted them with warm words. In this 
audience with Bayan, Wen Tianxiang desperately tried to pretend that Song 
had not already surrendered to Yuan and attempted to get Bayan to agree to 
terms less than surrender, but Bayan would have none of it. Wen Tianxiang, 
in a revolting display of self-importance and wishful thinking, imperiously 
presented Bayan with a logically fallacious false dilemma: ‘Our court has 
inherited the imperial legitimacy and is the abode of civilisation and culture. 
Will the Northern Court [i.e. Yuan Court] be a friendly allied state, or will it 
destroy the [Song] altars of soil and grain?’ 11  Bayan sought at first to 
reassure Wen Tianxiang’s delegation by conveying his intentions in terms of 
Khubilai’s commands: he would neither touch the Song altars nor kill the 
Song population. Desperately wanting to see in Bayan’s reply something he 
almost certainly knew was not there, Wen Tianxiang replied: 
                                                     
10 Liu Minzhong, Ping Song Lu [Record of the Pacification of Song] (Taipei 1989)  
2.16. 
11 Bi Yuan, Xu Zizhi Tongjian 182.4977. 
Wen Tianxiang’s logical fallacy here is what David Hackett Fischer calls the ‘fallacy 
of many questions,’ one variety of which is ‘framing a question in such a way that 
two or more questions are asked at once, and a single answer is required.’ More 
precisely, it is a variety of the fallacy of many questions that Fischer calls the ‘fallacy 
of false dichotomous questions,’ which is ‘a special form of the fallacy of many 
questions, which deserves to be singled out for special condemnation. It arises from 
the abuse of an exceedingly dangerous conceptual device. Dichotomy is a division 
into two parts. If it is properly drawn, the parts are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive, so that there is no overlap, no opening in the middle, and 
nothing omitted at either end.’ D.H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Towards a Logic of 
Historical Thought (London 1970) 9-10. 






If the Northern Court wants to be a friendly allied state, please 
withdraw your troops to Pingjiang or Jiaxing, and then [we will] 
deliberate on annual payments and the rewards for your troops. The 
Northern Court completely withdrawing its forces is the best policy. 
If [the Northern Court] wants to destroy our ancestral temple, then 
[consider that] [Eastern and Western] Huai[nan] Circuits, Fujian, 
[Liang]Zhe [East and West Circuits], Guang[nan East and West 
Circuits], and still many more [jurisdictions] have not yet fallen; 
victory and defeat are as yet unknown; and the continuous ravages of 
war would certainly start from this.12 
 
Bayan, apparently taken aback by Wen’s chutzpah, gradually became less 
reassuring in his tone of voice. Wen then responded with braggadocio and 
bravado that betrayed his fragile male ego: ‘I am the Principal Graduate and 
Grand Councilor of the Southern Court; I have but my one death to give in 
requital to my country. I fear neither sword nor saw nor cauldron nor pot!’13 
Bayan and his generals looked at each other in bewilderment for a moment, 
and then Bayan, having seen through Wen’s antics, dealt with the situation 
intelligently by sending everyone back to the Song court except for Wen, 
whom he ordered be kept under military guard because he correctly 
regarded Wen as unstable, mercurial, and harbouring obstreperous 
intentions and purposes. Wen Tianxiang persisted in requesting that he be 
allowed to return to Song, but Bayan simply laughed at these requests. This 
angered Wen Tianxiang, who demanded of Bayan an explanation of why the 
others in his delegation were allowed to return to Lin’an while he alone was 
detained at Bayan’s military headquarters. Bayan made a show of answering 
him with warm and consoling words: ‘Don’t be angry. You are a major 
official for the Song [royal] family, and your responsibilities are not light. 
Since you came here with good intentions, it is only normal for you to talk 
together with me about current matters. I only wish to detain you for a few 
days.’ With this, he ordered officers to accompany Wen Tianxiang and keep 
an eye on him.14  
On 11 February 1276 Bayan ordered that Grand Empress Dowager 
Xie’s surrender orders to all Song jurisdictions that had not yet submitted to 
                                                     
12 Bi Yuan, Xu Zizhi Tongjian 182.4977.  
13 These representing four different means by which he could be killed gruesomely. 
14 Liu, Ping Songlu 2.16; Bi Yuan, Xu Zizhi Tongjian 182.4977-78; Yuanshi 9.176. 




the Yuan be widely distributed. On 14 February the Song military was 
divided up and incorporated into the Yuan armies and sent to other 
assignments and posts. On 18 March Bayan finally entered Lin’an 
personally and stayed the night there, and the next day he threw a grand 
banquet in celebration of the Yuan victory over Song. On 27 March he left 
Lin’an, and thereafter other Yuan commanders would lead up subsequent 
campaigns against Song holdouts and diehards.15 
 
 
Song Pretenders and the final Battle of Yaishan, February 1276 - 
March 1279 
 
After Lin’an’s surrender and Bayan’s departure from China, the Yuan 
armies could not ignore the fugitive loyalist regime that had fled south. For 
the next three years, determined Yuan land and sea forces under the 
leadership of both Mongol and Chinese commanders pursued the Quixotic 
loyalist regime and mopped up pockets of resistance in Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Jiangxi, and Guangdong. Yuan forces almost always made mincemeat of the 
forces of Song loyalist pretenders in any engagement with them, and during 
these last three years the Yuan armies reverted to wholesale butchery of 
entire towns that resisted them.16   
By early 1279 the last remnants of Song loyalists had fled the 
mainland entirely and went out to sea aboard thousands of ships. The final 
decisive battle that finally sank (literally) the Song loyalist cause took place 
on the sea off the coast of Yaishan (about 120 kilometres due west of 
modern Hong Kong) in March 1279. What Zhang Shijie, the commander of 
the Song loyalist navy, did at Yaishan was pure folly: he tethered up his 
ships, which numbered over a thousand, with ropes into a single line and 
had them drop anchor, with bows inward and sterns outward. He would 
make his final stand here, as if his navy were a stationary land force! He was 
weary of fleeing: ‘Lo these many years we have voyaged upon the seas. Now 
we must decide between us and them the victor and the vanquished.’17 He 
                                                     
15 Liu, Ping Songlu 2.16-18; Yuanshi 9.176; Bi Yuan, Xu Zizhi Tongjian 102.4977-
4978. 
16 There were, by my reckoning, at least six massacres of southern Chinese cities 
during this time: Chaozhou (partial), Jingjiang, Nanfeng, Shashi, Xinghua (partial), 
and Zhenchao.  
17 Bi Yuan, Zizhi Tongjian 184.5025. 





was a desperate and psychologically exhausted man who had fought the 
Yuan for over a decade, and he led a resistance movement drained of 
morale and resolve. His final act of tactical desperation was to place the boy 
emperor in the largest ship in the centre of his line of ships.  
The Mongol Yuan commander, a northern Chinese named Zhang 
Hongfan, had many fewer and smaller warships than the Song loyalists, but 
what he lacked in numbers and size he more than made up for with the 
speed and mobility his ships would have around the tethered and anchored 
Song navy. Zhang Hongfan understood the advantages he would have 
intuitively and quickly; indeed, ‘the advantages of mobility were readily 
apparent to one who had fought for the Mongols so long and so well.’18  
On the morning of 20 March 1279, Zhang Hongfan directed his 
smaller and lighter ships to go north of the tethered Song formation. When 
the tide went out, this smaller Yuan force attacked southward along with 
the tide, while the main Yuan fleet of larger ships attacked from the south 
and set several Song ships alight. Later that morning, Zhang Hongfan 
ordered boarding operations, the purpose of which was more to kill the 
people aboard Song vessels than to sink the vessels per se. The boarding 
operations raged on for most of the day, but at around 5:00 pm, in the fog 
and confusion of battle, the colours of a Song warship were stricken. Many 
more Song naval vessels then followed suit because they thought a 
surrender order had been issued. The Song resolve evaporated in an instant, 
and many Song naval personnel stripped off their uniforms and surrendered. 
The Yuan navy captured some 800 Song warships, many of which were 
later used in Khubilai Khan’s invasions of Japan. An orgy of Song suicides 
ensued, with thousands upon thousands of Song loyalists leaping into the 
sea and drowning. The aftermath of Yaishan was a grizzly spectacle of 
perhaps 100,000 bodies floating in the sea.19   
  With their speed, mobility, and smaller sizes and numbers, the Yuan 
ships at Yaishan were deployed and functioned like nomadic cavalry, and 
the Song navy functioned like stationary infantry forces on land. Yuan 
warships, the cavalry of the sea, surrounded and picked off not squadrons 
of trapped foot soldiers, but a fleet of tethered and anchored naval vessels. 
One imagines that Zhang Hongfan could hardly have believed his own 
                                                     
18 D.C. Wright, ‘Navies in the Mongol Yuan Conquest of Song China 1274-1279’, 
Mongolian Studies 29 (2007) 207-216: 209-210. 
19 Wright, ‘Navies in the Mongol Yuan Conquest’, 209-211.  




good luck and the foolishness of his adversary. In the end, it all concluded 
too easily, and Jennifer Jay may well be right in speculating that the Mongol 
Yuan victory was ‘a surprise for both sides.’20 But surprise or no, in the 
spring of 1279, a final world-class naval battle completed the conquests of 
the Mongol empire: 
 
The Battle of Yaishan was the single largest naval battle in 
Chinese history, but its importance and magnitude remain 
underappreciated and largely unknown in the West and even in 
China. Since around 1400 warships and at least 200,000 people 
were involved in the fighting in some way, either as soldiers or 
civilians (Zhang Shijie placed military and civilian personnel alike 
aboard his roped and anchored warships), in some measures 
(although certainly not in terms of tonnage or area of action) the 
Battle of Yaishan may well also stand alongside the greatest naval 
battles of all time, including the Battles of Salamis (480 BCE), 
Cape Ecnomus (456 BCE), Jutland (31 May 1916), and Leyte 
Gulf (23-26 October 1944). The Battle of Yaishan both finished 
the Mongol conquest of China and achieved the farthest 
territorial extent of the Mongol World Empire. Indeed, the 
largest land empire the world has ever known was completed by 
one of history’s great battles at sea.21  
 
Nevertheless, the naval dimensions (both riverine and littoral) of the Yuan 
conquest should not be overstated or overdrawn; by themselves they were 
necessary but not sufficient in and of themselves to secure Yuan victory. 
Foot soldiers and, on two occasions, siege technicians did play 
indispensable roles in establishing the credible threat necessary for 
convincing most cities to submit peacefully. Further, even more than it was 
military, the Mongol conquest of China was political and psychological. 
That is, if during the 1270s every Song Chinese city had resisted the Yuan 
onslaught with the stoutness and determination that Xiangyang and 
Fancheng had, not even the Mongols would have succeeded in conquering 
China. Chinese collaboration with, and large-scale defection to, the Mongol 
Yuan cause were the most important elements in a complex constellation of 
necessary and contributing factors that led to the final collapse of Song in 
                                                     
20  J.W. Jay, A Change in Dynasties: Loyalism in Thirteenth-Century China (Bellingham, 
WA 1991) 57. 
21 Wright, ‘Navies in the Mongol Yuan Conquest’, 213.  





1279. As well, included in this causal constellation must also be more 
ineffable factors such as Song’s defeatism, capitulationism, and low morale; 
general disgust with the incompetence and ineffectualness of the moribund 
Song state; and the growing conviction among millions of Chinese that 
heaven itself must be on the side of the Mongol Yuan, as evidenced by its 
relentless accumulation of victories, one after another. Song was losing the 
Mandate of Heaven, and Yuan was gaining it. 
 
 
Yuan and the national unification of China  
 
As destructive as it was, the Mongol conquest was not, in the end, entirely 
negative for China. Painting and drama flourished under Mongol rule, and 
the Mongols helped create a plain written language in China because they 
spoke only simple colloquial Chinese and could not read complex and 
allusive literary Chinese. But China’s most important long-term legacy from 
the Mongol conquest is the identity of the People’s Republic of China today 
as a multi-ethnic state. As a part of the larger Mongol World Empire, the 
Mongol Yuan reunified historically Chinese territory and defined it for the 
subsequent Chinese Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and the larger Manchu Qing 
empire (1644-1912). Indeed, as Okada Hidehiro has trenchantly observed:  
 
The greatest legacy of the Mongol Empire bequeathed to the Chinese 
is the Chinese nation itself (…) In contrast to the Republic of China, 
which was a Chinese nation-state as was the Ming, the People’s 
Republic of China is not China but an empire in the mould of the 
Mongol Empire.22 
 
Ironically enough, then, in addition to being a victory for the Mongol World 
Empire, Yaishan was a victory for China as well. The Yuan accomplished 
what China since the fall of the Tang in 907 CE could not: the unification of 
historically Chinese territory under one government. For the first time in 
over three and a half centuries, China was one again. The division of China 
into two or more parts (usually northern and southern) was gone after 1279.  
                                                     
22 H. Okada, ‘China as a Successor State to the Mongol Empire’ in: R. Amitai-Press 
and D.O. Morgan ed., The Mongol Empire and its Legacy (Leiden 2000) 260-272: 260, 
270. 




In Beijing’s current unificationist religion regarding Taiwan, national 
territorial division is regarded as one of the worst things imaginable, while 
unification of historically Chinese territory under one government is seen as 
the ultimate and greatest goal and good to which any Chinese state and 
society could aspire. But which dynasty, after all, actually established and 
more or less defined this territorial extent? Which government reunified all 
of historically Chinese territory (and much more) under one government for 
the first time in over 350 years? Was it the effete little court 小朝廷 of Song 
and the small territory 半壁江山 under its control, or was it the foreign and 
‘barbarian’ Mongol World Empire? 
In Chinese culture Wen Tianxiang is typically apotheosised, especially 
by his descendants, as an ardent patriot and a model of constancy and 
loyalty, but in actuality he was a difficult and garrulous man who ‘was 
arrogant, blunt, and overbearing and simply could not get along with the 
other officials’.23 What is more, in defying the Yuan armies and insisting on 
pretending that the Song was not a doomed dynasty that had already 
surrendered, this unstable and solipsistic blowhard was actually resisting the 





Speed and mobility on land first, then rivers, and finally the sea won for the 
Mongols their empire. Instead of envisioning the Mongol conquest of China 
mainly if not completely as a conquest from horseback, we should see it, 
especially in its latter stages, as a series of complex operations afloat, afoot, 
and ahorseback. It took the swift and mobile tactics of the Mongol Yuan to 
do what no native Chinese dynasty had done since 907 CE: unify China.  
                                                     
23 Jay, A Change in Dynasties, 51.  
